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The governments and people of the developing nations are attempting to
accelerate economic development in their respective countries through the use of various
developmental models which they adapt to fit their particular needs. These attempts are
aimed at improving the social, economic, and political opportunities within their national
boundaries. In the three North African countries of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, one
of the several models that has been tried, particularly in the agricultural sector, is
cooperatives. This paper deals specifically with some of the aspects of this cooperative
movement. It is not to be inferred that the cooperative model has been or presently is
the only model applicable to the Maghrebian situation. In fact, the cooperative model
has been one of the least successful of the various avenues of economic development
tried within the region. This limited success has not been because of lack of effort.
The cooperative idea has been extensively used and misused within the three countries.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate some of the historical, political, and social
factors which relate to cooperative development within the Maghreb and to ascertain
some of the causes of this limited success.
* Donald G. Brown, Instructor, Office of International Agricultural Programs, is
the proiect coordinator of the Peace Corps Agricultural Intern Program.Analyzed according to Schaars ‘ “hardcore” principles forcooperatives ([n service at
cost, [2] democratic control, [3] I imited return upon equity capital), most but not all cooP-
1
eratives in North Africa are lacking. There are many “true” cooperatives in the Maghreb,
particularly among those started during the colonial period. The French colons brought with
them the active cooperative movement that was developing in Metropolitan France. 2
The
initial cooperatives they established were in agricultural credit. These and other cooperatives
developed during the colonial period were similar to those in Metropolitan France in that
both were developed in a manner “fairly intimately bound up with the State. ”3 Yet even with
this intimate involvement of the State, most cooperatives during this period remained general IY
autonomous and democratic.
The extent of this cooperative development
cooperatives iust before independence. Algeria as
of which were for wine production and marketing.
can be seen
of 1955 had
in data of North African
490 cooperatives, almost half
Others were in marketing of fruits and
vegetables, cereals, and dairy products. Supply cooperatives as wel I as those for insurance
and credit were also found. In the same period there were over 100 cooperatives in Tunisia,
mostly in credit , insurance, and marketing of wine and fruits. In Morocco there were also more




Marvin A. Schaars, “Basic Principles of Cooperatives: Their Growth and Development”
in Agricultural Cooperation, ed. by Martin A. Abrahamsen and Claud L. Scroggs (Minneapolis,
Mn.: University of M in~ota Press, 1957), p. 191.
2Sheila Gorst, The Structure of the French Cooperative Movement, Occasional Paper #10,




International Labour Office, International Directory of Cooperative Organizations,
Eleventh Edition (Geneva, Switzerland, 1958), pp. 15, 133, 189.2
Yet it should be noted that the cooperative idea was a European import brought by the
colons for their own exclusive use and benefit, Although these cooperatives generally satis-
fied Schaars’ “hard core” principles for cooperatives, they did so for Europeans only and not
for the indigenous population.
An example of this exclusiveness can be seen in the area of agricultural credit in
Morocco. “ Two distinct lines of agricultural credit were set up under the protectorate,
one for Europeans
cooperatives, the
‘ Through the government supported credit and the other for Moroccan s.”
Caisse de Pr8ts Immobil iers for medium and long-term loans, the Caisses
Mutuel Ies de Credit Agricole for short-term loans, and the Caisse F&derale de la Mutual itd .—. — —.
et de la Cooperation Agricole, the European found ample sources for capital improvement.
On the other hand, most indigenous Moroccan farmers (fel Iah) were required to be a member
of the Soci& Marocaines de Pr&oyance (S. O. M.A. P.) and to pay into them a certain ——
amount each time he paid his tax on any property or crop he owned. This fund was ostensibly
the basis of a “credit cooperative” that the fellah could borrow from. But, in fact, during the
protectorate period, little was loaned out of S. O. M.A. P. and what small amount was loaned
was short-term credit only to “modern” farmers. “The great mass of the fellahin was getting no
assistance at all from the S.O. M. A. P.”2
Yet during the colonial period there was one maior exception to the strict limitation
to the European population of the cooperative idea as defined by Schaars. In March, 1946,
—
1
Charles F. Stewart, The Economy of Morocco 1912-1962, Harvard Middle Eastern
Monograph Series X11 (Cambridge, Mass. 19~), P. lo~.
2
Ibid., p. 108.3
Erik Labonne became Resident General of French Morocco. He was aided by a smal I group
*
of French liberal intellectuals, among them Jacques Berque and Ju!ien Couleau. 1 Labonne
and his coterie sought moderation and reform in the colonial pol icy, The sociologist Berque,
in particular, was interested in rural and agrarian reform and modernization, especial IY through
the Berber tribal councils, the Jema~s.
The Jema~ was a tribal council made up of the head, or a representative of each family
in the tribe. It acted in a democratic fashion to resolve disputes within the tribe.2 Berque had
hoped that this indigenous local democratic institution could be the basis for true local partici-
pation and rural reform. 3
During Labonne’s brief epoch as Resident General, Berque and Couleau established a
program of rural reform built on what were called Secteurs de Modernisation du Paysanat (S. M. P.).
This plan was conceived on the principle of multiple impact on the I ives of the peasant through
special secteurs, each given intensive attention in a broad-based program of agrarian, social,
and political reform. Each S. M. P. was to have a literacy program, primary school, and rural
dispensary as well as a machine-tractor station for the modernization of agriculture. The
farmers were to form a supply cooperative far mutual buying of inputs and a marketing cooperative
to store and sel I their products. The entire S.M. P. was to be run through
4
revital ized Jema~ with assistance and advice from a French technician.
the direction of a
.
‘Douglas Ashford, National Development and Local Reform: Political Participation
in Morocco, Tunisia and Pa=an, (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1-28.
2Bernard G. Hoffman, The Structure of Traditional Moroccan Rural societY, (The Haguet
The Netherlands: Mouton & Co~~Z7.
3
Ash ford, p. 28.
4
[bid., p. 197.4
However, this program did not fully materialize. Although the S. M. P.’s were established,
Berque’s and Couleau’s reforms never developed. The French colons were opposed to the idea
of rural reform and autonomy for the fellah, and the Moroccan nationalists did not feel they
could support the reforms because such reforms would make France seem benevolent, This
1
could undermine their objectives of independence. In the end, the program died; Labonne
was replaced in May, 1947, by General Alphonse Juin, a hard liner strongly backing the
interests of the colons. After the reformists’ efforts failed, the S. M. P.’s lost their democratic
and social missions. Eventually, the S.M. P.’s were reduced to the role of service stations
2
performing work as needed for the middle-sized peasant. The idea of the S. M. P. (without
its social and educational overtones) has been used without marked success in various forms in
Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco in their development plans.
POST-INDEPENDENCE COOPERATIVE
With independence, cooperative development changed.
DEVELOPMENT
Many of the cooperatives
developed by the colons continued in operation, but as the colons returned or were forced
back to France, they were replaced by rich North African farmers who bought them out or who
through other means found themselves in control of the colons’ farms.
But for most of the fel lah the situation remained the same or became worse. More and
more a peasant farmer found himself compelled either directly or indirectly to ioin state
“cooperatives. ” State cooperatives existed before independence, but now they became
ubiquitous,
.
‘Douglas Ashford, Political Change in Morocco,
University Press, 1961), p. 65.
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
2
Ashford (National Development. ..), p. 194.5
The state “cooperatives” have two characteristics differing from Schaars’ basic
cooperative principles: (1) Central government control of all major decisions (non-democratic),
and (2) in most cases, mandatory membership. These state “cooperatives” really are not
cooperatives as we understand the term in the United States because they are undemocratic.
Furthermore, as Schaars has noted, “The concept of cooperation is also based on Voluntaryism.
Coercion or compulsion is the antithesis of cooperation. Freedom to belong or not to belong
to a cooperative is basic to its underlying philosophy. ‘“
An example of two such state cooperatives are Cooperative Marocaines Agricole (C. M.A. )
and Soci4t&’s Cooperatives Agricole Marocaines (S. C.A M. ). The International Labour Office
2
referred to these as non-cooperatives. A Moroccan government official responded to this sort
of criticism: “It has sometimes been said that the C. M.A, and S. C. A.M. are not true coopera -
tives and that they are rather government stores. The criticism is not fully justified. Indeed,
they are cooperatives according to Moroccan legislation because they are constituted and are
run within the framework of the laws establishing the cooperative organization under state
control. Although they do not always comply with all accepted cooperative principles, they
“3 In other words, are nevertheless a first attempt to introduce cooperation in rural areas.
they are cooperatives not because they follow cooperative principles but because the
government says they are!
John Simmons describes the state cooperatives of North Africa by saying: “With few
exceptions Arab cooperatives are state farms; the majority of the routine and policy decisions are
1
Schaars, p. 186.
21nternational Labour Office, p. 133.
3Georges Monnet, “Extra Cooperative Services of Some Moroccan Cooperatives” in
Yearbook of Agricultural Cooperation 1964, p. 225.6
made by non-members. The term cooperative is a cold war convenience which assists some of
the nations of the Middle East and North Africa to obtain the aid and favor of both East and
West.’”
The post-independence development of cooperatives and of state cooperatives differed
with each country of the Maghreb.
Tunisia
Of the three, Tunisia has had initial Iy the most vigorous and subsequently the most
disastrous experience with cooperatives. Briefly, the Tunisian use of cooperatives went through
2
three stages: (1) Status quo, (2) gradualism, and (3) crisis.
After Tunisia gained independence in 1956, Bourguiba was faced with the problem of
keeping his still heavily dependent country from tail spinning into economic chaos. In order
to take a pragmatic position, he chose to maintain the economic status quo while trying to
reform social institutions. In the period iust before independence (1947-1 950), there had been
a spontaneous grouping of private farmers by free association into supply cooperatives for the
purchase of inputs. During the status quo period after independence, the government also
gradual Iy began to expand its role in cooperatives through state cooperatives used to manage
expropriated colon farms.
After a few years with the status quo situation, pressure began to mount within the
government for a more dynamic control of the country’s economy. The gradualism period began
with the introduction in 1962 of the Ten Year Plan developed primarily by Ahmed Ben Salah.
.
I
John L. Simmons, “Agricultural Cooperatives and Tunisian Development”, in
The Middle East Journal, 24:455, Fall, 1970.
2
[bid., pp. 456-465.7
During this period the state cooperatives expanded as more colon Iand was bought, The state
.—
cooperatives also began to extend into other tribal lands, forming them into Unit~s for
irrigated farming under state management. The government also began to involve itself with
the previously formed free association supply cooperatives.
The third stage of crisis began in May, 1964, when, after Bourguiba seized the
remaining unsold colon lands, the French government retaliated with economic sanctions.
To meet this crisis, the Tunisian government under Ben Salah’s direction expanded the
state cooperative program into wider and wider areas, even into retail commerce. This led
to increasing inefficiency in production due to overloading of the now centralized government
controls and greater resentment and rebel 1ion among the population at their lack of economic
freedom. In September, 1969, the entire program collapsed. Tunisia is presently reevaluating
its prospects for cooperative development.
Algeria
The violence of the struggle for
structure more in Algeria than in either
independence tore apart the social and political infra-
Tunisia or Morocco. Thus, the Algerians had less to
start with. Under Ben Bel la the
has continued until today. This
government took a strong “progressive socialist” stance that
was not a good environment for cooperatives.
Although agricultural reform was one of the first promises of the Ben Bells government,
I ittle happened until January, 1972, when the program for the “Agrarian Revolution” was
1
presented, In terms of state cooperatives, certain’’principles” were laid down. There wil I
1
Michael Wall and Sue Dearden, “The Maghreb: A Survey”, The Economist,
March 11, 1972, p. 18.8
not be forced membership in state cooperatives for farm management (i. e., COIIective farms) for
small land owners. They wil I be free to farm their land as they please but wil I be “encouraged”
to take advantage of the state farm management cooperative. There will be enforced membership
1
into “service” cooperatives handling credit, supplies, and marketing of farm products. It is
too early to see how this “revolution” will develop.
Morocco
Moroccan use of cooperatives has not been as widespread as that in Tunisia or Algeria.
Most of the cooperatives developed by the French colons continued even after independence;
but as more of the colons left, the cooperatives either died or were taken over by rich Moroccan
farmers. State cooperatives existed before independence particularly in the area of credit.
Since independence the credit role has been taken over more and more by Caisse Nationale
de Cridit Agricole (C. N. C. A.) which hopes to establish local cooperative agricultural credit
banks.
2
For the smal Ier farmers, most seeds and fertilizer are handled through the Soci~t~s
Cooperative Agricole Marocaines (S. C.A. M. ), a state cooperative store. 3 Larger farmers
use S. C. A.M. or the local market for buying inputs.




These groupements are a method used by the Moroccan government for the
and education of peasant farmers to increase agricultural production. They are
1




T. M. Ke!so, R. E. McKnight, J. L. Nevin , and R. A. Russel, Morocco: Role of
Fertilizer in Agricultural Development, (Tennessee Valley Authority, Muscle Shoals, Alabama,
196 7), P. 67.
3
Ibid., p. 47.supposed to lead eventual Iy to ful I scale farmer cooperatives. They are established by 7 to 20
farmers grouping together to undertake a specific economic task such as buying fertilizer or
a tractor. Each farmer in the groupement takes full liability for a loan from the government
to the groupement to complete the economic task desired. The groupement is used by the
government as a basis for extension programs, and, in some cases, various other government
programs, often through coercion. In theory it is a program to develop autonomous, member-
controlled cooperatives, but in practice it is an indirect means to establish government control
1
over peasant farm pract ices.
Why has the Maghreb taken a course general Iy toward state cooperatives, collective
farms, government stores, etc., rather than toward cooperatives fol lowing Schaars’ hard core
principles, particularly his principle of democratic member control? Why, for example, did
none of the three countries attempt to reestablish Berque’s and Couleau’s ideas concerning the
S,M. P? Why is it typical to find in North Africa laws such as the 1963 Tunisian agricultural
cooperative law, which “was different from most cooperative laws, as it left out the usual
definition of a voluntary organization of people to obtain a certain goal as a basic description
2
of a cooperative ?“
In progressive socialist Algeria, this situation follows fairly logically, As Smith
observes concerning cooperatives in a progressive socialist system, “ It would seem that coopera-
tives or other farmers’ organizations can exist only as a branch of the Civil Service unless an
organic concept of society is accepted. According to this concept an individual has certain
natural rights in society; and when he forms as association, it too has rights which are not derived
1
Josu~ Bensimon, “Le Groupement Precooperatif”, Bulletin Economique et Social du
Maroc , 108:89-101, January, 1968,
2
M. P. Moore and M. S. Lewis, “Agrarian Reform and the Development of Agri-
cultural Cooperation in Tunisia, ” Yearbook of Agricultural Cooperation 1968, p. 42.10
merely from the State.’”
But what about Morocco and Tunisia ? These
the progressive social ist path. Why did they too use
tives?
are two countries that did not follow
state cooperatives in I ieu of true coopera-
To answer this question it would be helpful to know the position
countries found themselves in upon achieving independence. The maior
the Maghreb faced included:
the North African
agricultural problems




losing their high productivity.
lack of trained indigenous cadre to undertake a maior role in agricultural
3, Lack of capital and savings for investment.
4. Large numbers of peasants with I ittle or no knowledge of farming wanting to return
to “their” land,
5. Increasing rural misery with a corresponding massive migration to spreading urban slums.
In trying to find a means of resolving these problems, the leaders of the North African
countries sought some model they could emulate. For many of them, “the Eastern European
models of large mechanized farms run by a technical elite for the benefit of the peasant were
2
very attractive. ” These models were attractive because the East European countries had iust
developed from a position I ike that which North Africa was experiencing at the time.3 They were
I
Louis P. F. Smith, The Evolution of Agricultural Cooperation,
Blackwell Press, 1961), pp. 114-115.
2r . ~lmmons, p. 52.
3Manfred Halgren, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle
(Oxford, England: Basil
East and North Africa ,
(Princeton, N. J.: P~inceton University Press 1963), p: 163.11
economically backward and sought “to achieve progress, status, and power in a hurry. ”
Another attractive feature of these model swasthe fact that they had begun witha Iackof
capital, “hence, (they) would find it useful to force savings and use the state to direct invest-




in style and status yet stil I in process of overcoming its economic develop-
Yet while the Eastern European models of COIIective farming were becoming more
popular among North African officials, “the East Europeans were becoming disil Iusioned with
the large central IY control led state farms. II
2
In Yugoslavia for example, the “working coopercr-
tives” or COIIectivizea’ farm program started slowly in 1945, went through a rapid expansion in
1949, and reached its peak in 1950-51, then rapidly began to decline. By 1953 the Yugo-
3
slavian cooperatives had entered into a process of disintegration. A Ithough many factors
were involved in this COIlapse, “the primary cause was real ization (by the government) that
,,4
COIIectivization had failed to alter basic attitudes and to enlist the cooperation of the peasants.
The young North African nationalists were strongly influenced by the seeming success in
the early 50’s of the East European model but apparently were not aware of its eventual outcome.
After independence they were anxious to apply this model to their own problems. But now as





Jozo Tomasevich, Chapter 7, “Collectivization of Agriculture in Yugoslavia” in
Collectivization of Agriculture in Eastern Europe, ed. by Irwin T. Sanders, (University of
Kentucky Press, 1958), p. 172.
4
[bid., p. 192.12
Arab country todoaway with this unsuccessful model. ”~ Morocco and Algeria do not seem
to have learned much from the lesson of Tunisia. Algeria in particular is plummeting headlong
into the same situation with its “Agrarian Revolution. ”
The question still persists: Why did the Maghreb choose to develop agriculture in a
COIIective state-control fashion rather than through the
with the Eastern European models does not seem the ful I
use of cooperatives? Blind infatuation
reason. A possible answer might be
found by examining the reasons North Africans themselves give. A typical answer is one
Simmons reports an official in the Ministry of Agriculture in Tunisia gave him concerning the
development of the cooperatives there: “The original model had the peasants running the
cooperative, with assistance from the state. But when the cooperative got started, (the officials’)
co! leagues real ized that the peasants were not capable of running such an operation, and that
the state would have to take responsibility for their direction.
,,2
The assumed inability of the
peasant to control his own affairs is used again and again as the reason for direct state intervention
in his affairs. For example, in an article supporting state controlled groupement precooperatifs
in Morocco, the peasant is pictured in such a way that if he had a true cooperative where he had
a voice in his own concerns he would believe he was a privileged citizen and would only demand
gifts, aids, and other supplements from the government. Thus he would “tend less to use the
3







Does this idea have substance in real ii-y? Are the indigenous North African farmers
unable to control their own affairs and do they require state intervention to direct them? No.
View for example the spontaneous growth of free association supply cooperatives in Tunisia iust
prior to independence when the French I iberal ized local control. And after the disastrous
experience with state cooperatives ended in 1969, these free association cooperatives have
1
come back to life unaided.
[t should also be noted that North African farmers are not a monolith of traditional,
fatalistic, uneducated peasants; there is a wide variety of education, wealth, and experience
among the fellah. To generalize that they are unable to control their own local affairs is as
erroneous as the same accusation at a minority group in the United States such as the American
Indians.
And stil I another factor to note is
especially among Moroccan and Algerian
the traditional rural society’s means of self-government,
Berber tribes whose councils, or Jema~s, handle tribal —
matters in a sophisticated, democratic fashion.
The ability to regulate one’s own affairs is not as foreign to the peasant as some may
want to believe. Ashford, in studying minutes of local Moroccan communes, which were
established briefly after independence? came to the following concl usions: “The COmmUne
minutes are perhaps the best available evidence of the untapped energies and unused cognitive
skill at the local level. This is not to suggest that complex development programs wil I be
spontaneous y supported by vil lagers, but that the local citizen may be much more prepared
to evaluate his position in
1
Simmons, p. 57.
life and to relate his affairs to the needs and goals of the higher14
echelons of political affairs than most Moroccans and Westerners have been willing to
1
admit. ”
The argument that the local farmers are unable to organize and support a local
cooperative venture by themselves seems a bit dubious. Thus, the question stil I is: Why
have not the North African countries encouraged the deve Iopment of true cooperatives?
The answer, I believe, is found in the social, political, and economic dichotomies within
the region. The tensions and infighting between the rich and the poor; the powerful and
the weak; the European and the Maghrebian; the Arab and the Berber; the city dwe I Ier and
the country dwel Ier; the educated and the uneducated; the landed and the landless create
so much distrust and self-protectiveness that people fear any uncontrolled association which
might rearrange the power structure to their disadvantage.
Several examples show how the cooperative mood has been retarded. When the
French arrived in North Africa to establish their social, political, and economic dominance
over the inhabitants, they found that they could slip into an already existing dualistic
society represented by the Sultan’s or Bey ’s authoritarian rule of the countryside. The
French centralized bureaucracy merely enforced, expanded, and made more coldly efficient
the centralized, downward-flowing authority that was the traditional government of the
Arabs. This semi-feudal form of government had not changed markedly by the time
independence arrived in North Africa. In such a situation, no matter what the polemics,
“when the State (or a group) has absolute right to override the individual. . ,cooperation of
‘Ashford, p. 49.15
individuals can only obstruct that right. ‘“
Observers have noted that the King of Morocco has often expressed the opinion
that “if he permitted others to voice opinions and take action that detracted from his
,,2
monarchal position he might lose control of events. In the same manner, other officials
and notables in government and private life down to persons as insignificant as petit
functionaires have the same fear. Thus, in Tunisia we find that while state cooperatives
were spoken of in glowing terms by Bourguiba, they were in fact “obviously a convenient
device to control and supervise the activity of thousands of Tunisians. The entire
cooperative movement (had) been centralized in Tunis and (was) closely managed from the
provincial Ieve I by the governors and the Regional Cooperative Federation composed of
,,3
party reliables and high officials.
Any attempts to organize or give a voice to the lower echelons is looked upon with
apprehension. In 1956, for example, a Caid, Lohcen Lyoussi,
Morocco, tried to organize a conservative peasant movement,
because of its overtones of Berber tribal parochialism.4
an intimate of the King of
but the King stopped it
This pattern is repeated again and again throughout North Africa. It is not limited
to any one type of government or a particular leader. Be it a traditional monarchy in
Morocco or a progressive socialist state in Algeria, the powerful rule the nonpowerful and
feel threatened by any means used to change that situation. The attitude extends beyond
government down through tribes to the individual ,
‘Smith, p. 113.
2
Ash ford, p. 40.
31bid., p. 213.
4Halpren, p. 95.16
Berquegives an example of such asituation with cooperativesin Egypt, although
the example would fit in any of the Maghrebian countries. In 1955, the cooperative movement
in Egypt held a congress in Cairo. The cotton cooperative had problems with selfish vil Iage
bosses and their misuse of the credit bank. To counter the influence of the village notables,
the cooperative was limited to farmers of less than five feddens; but it turned out that a three-
fedden farmer was already a petty exploiter and the reform shifted the advantage to him from
1
the village notable. The exploited became the exploiter.
The situation facing cooperatives in North Africa is best typified by comments by
Poncet on cooperatives in the Sebou proiect in northwestern Morocco. “It is general Iy feared
that the cooperatives wil I succeed and become too popular
and block the free expansion and the prosperity of the new
who replaced his former master, the colon.
CONCLUSION
or they will waste previous resources
2
capita list,” the rich Moroccan farmer
The future of cooperatives in North Africa is difficult to predict with the exception of
Algeria. As long as Algeria feels it must fulfill its revolutionary, progressive socialist destiny,
voluntary free association cooperatives have I ittle chance to develop. But in Morocco and
Tunisia, there appears to be no maior theoretical blockage to cooperative development but at
governmental and upper echelon levels there is a persistent reluctance and/or resistance to
actively supporting cooperative development. When it comes to cooperatives, words are
spoken, but deeds are not done.
1
Jacques Berque, The Arabs: Their History and Future , (London, England: Faber
and Faber, 1960), p. 159~
2
J. Poncet, “ Grand Proiets et Difficutes Marocaines” in Revue Tier Monde, (Paris,
France 41 :210), January, 1970,17
Cooperative association is not foreign or unknown to these societies, nor is democratic
control of affairs at the local level. Middle-class farmers have the capital and political
expertise to make a cooperative work. Even among the peasant class there are a number of
“rich” peasants who could undertake a cooperative venture. For the truly poverty-stricken
peasantry, some assistance would be needed in terms of pal itical guidance and the lending of
capital and technical inputs; but with enlightened application of this assistance, there would
be no need for direct control by the State. Yet very I ittle has happened in free cooperative
development and what does occur is often discouraged by the State.
The social and psychological elements of fear, distrust and the protecting of one’s own
wealth and position through dominance over others seems to hold back any active cooperative
expansion. Before such expansion could ever develop, these social and psychological barriers
have to be examined and probed in detai I so that some way can be found to offset them.18
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